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In global health initiatives, particularly in the context of private philanthropy and its ‘business minded’
approach, detailed programme data plays an increasing role in informing assessments, improvements,
evaluations, and ultimately continuation or discontinuation of funds for individual programmes. The
HIV/AIDS literature predominantly treats monitoring as unproblematic. However, the social science of
audit and indicators emphasises the constitutive power of indicators, noting that their effects at a
grassroots level are often at odds with the goals speciﬁed in policy. This paper investigates users' ex-
periences of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems in the context of HIV interventions in western
India. Six focus groups (totalling 51 participants) were held with employees of 6 different NGOs working
for government or philanthropy-funded HIV interventions for sex workers in western India. Ten donor
employees were interviewed. Thematic analysis was conducted. NGO employees described a major gap
betweenwhat they considered their “real work” and the indicators used to monitor it. They could explain
the ofﬁcial purposes of M&E systems in terms of programme improvement and ﬁnancial accountability.
More cynically, they valued M&E experience on their CVs and the rhetorical role of data in demonstrating
their achievements. They believed that inappropriate and unethical means were being used to meet
targets, including incentives and coercion, and criticised indicators for being misleading and inﬂexible.
Donor employees valued the role of M&E in programme improvement, ﬁnancial accountability, and
professionalising NGO-donor relationships. However, they were suspicious that NGOs might be falsifying
data, criticised the insensitivity of indicators, and complained that data were under-used. For its users,
M& E appears an ‘empty ritual’, enacted because donors require it, but not put to local use. In this
context, monitoring is constituted as an instrument of performance management rather than as a means
of rational programme improvement.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Background
Recent decades have seen a rapid increase in the breadth and
intensity of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) practices in health
and development systems. For ‘New Public Management’, ‘Results-
Based Management’ and ‘Payment by Results’, the collection of
accurate monitoring data is seen as essential to the pro-
fessionalisation and rationalisation of health interventions
(Binnendijk, 2000; Hood, 1995). Progress towards highly-speciﬁed
targets can be monitored, and good performance rewarded (Earle,
2003; Kilby, 2004). The advent of major global health initiativesShukla), Paul.Teedon@gcu.ac.
Ltd. This is an open access article ufunded by philanthropic organisations such as the Gates Founda-
tion has brought a ‘business minded’ shift to New Public Manage-
ment in the 21st century. The Gates Foundation-funded Avahan
programme, for instance, emphasises its ‘data driven business
approach’ and ‘effective management model’ (Avahan, 2008; Rau,
2011), in which the management of performance through the
compilation of data is central.
According to evaluation literature, the major purposes of M&E
are threefold: (i) assessing programme effectiveness (ii) preventing
misappropriation of funds (iii) feedback and learning to improve
programme performance (Green and South, 2006; Rossi et al.,
2003; Shadish et al., 1991). While M&E policies presume a
rational model in which accurate information leads to better per-
formance, critics have cautioned that monitoring systems (for
example using key performance indicators) should not be simplynder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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dicators are partial, capturing some aspects of reality but not
others, thus leading to systematic gaps in what is recorded
(Armytage, 2011; Ika & Lytvynov, 2011; Savedoff et al., 2006). More
profoundly, it is argued that indicators actively construct reality.
Particularly when indicators are used as a basis for performance
management, those indicators come to deﬁne the problem, the role
of practitioners, and the identities of the ‘beneﬁciaries’ (Erikson,
2012; Lorway and Khan, 2014; Mawdsley et al., 2005). In the in-
terest of exploring the effects of monitoring systems at the grass-
roots level, this article investigates the experiences of the users of
M&E systems e NGO and donor staff e charged with putting
monitoring into practice.
In the HIV/AIDS literature to date, monitoring has been largely
treated either as a health-systems issue (regarding HIV incidence
and prevalence rates, sentinel surveillance), where the concern is
whether M&E is sufﬁciently resourced and embedded in health
systems (Peersman et al., 2009; Porter et al., 2012), or as a technical
issue, where the concern is with developing the ‘right’ indicators
and the focus is on indicators of service delivery, clinical work or
behaviour change communication (Ahonkhai et al., 2012;
Catumbela et al., 2013; Mannell et al., 2014) and achieving high
‘data quality’ (typically through web based applications with
decentralised data entry) (Nash et al., 2009). Collectively, this body
of work is oriented to incremental improvement of individual in-
dicators, improvement of M&E frameworks, and the institutional-
isation of M&E. There is generally little attention paid to how M&E
is actually implemented at grassroots level, how it is experienced
by frontline staff, or its effects at the grassroots level, despite the
fact that those ‘at the sharp end’ of healthcare policies, who are
charged with implementing them, may have important insights to
contribute (Aveling et al., 2015).
The exception is a body of recent research which investigates
questionable ‘data quality’ in routine reporting relating to HIV. For
example, Kaposhi et al. found that the number of adults receiving
antiretroviral therapy in the Eastern Cape, South Africa was over-
reported by 36.6% on the District Health Information System, and
recommended enhancing staff training, data-veriﬁcation proced-
ures, and reducing the clinical and reporting burdens on staff, to
make accurate record-keeping more manageable (Kaposhi et al.,
2015). Surveying the completeness and accuracy of records in a
large, prevention of mother to child transmission programme in
South Africa, Mate et al. found that reports submitted to the state
level were only 50% complete, and accurate only 13% of the time
(Mate et al., 2009). They suggest that the challenges are not only
technical, but also social, highlighting the commitment of clinic
staff as a key factor and therefore recommending that the collection
of monitoring data be shown to be useful at a local level, so that
staff have a sense of ownership and ‘buy-in’ to the aim of gathering
accurate data. These authors did not gather data about staff per-
ceptions, but speculate about their importance. This paper empir-
ically investigates staff perceptions, assuming, like Mate et al.
(2009), that how staff feel about their reporting activities has
important implications for both staff enthusiasm and data quality.
The data for this paper are drawn from HIV interventions in a
high prevalence state of western India. There is a large and growing
literature evaluating HIV interventions in India, which predomi-
nantly seeks to establish whether, and to what extent, in-
terventions have achieved positive results in terms of reducing HIV
transmission or risk factors (Ng et al., 2011; Vassall et al., 2014). A
smaller body of literature examines issues of process, seeking to
learn lessons about programme design, mechanisms of change, and
implementation (Narayanan et al., 2012; Wheeler et al., 2012).
Until the recent papers by Lorway and Khan (2014); and
Biradavolu et al. (2015), however, we could ﬁnd no evidence ofother studies on HIV in the Indian context that had considered
monitoring as an active process, constructing people and practices,
rather than simply reﬂecting them. Lorway and Khan (2014)
explore how the epidemiological categories used in HIV interven-
tion terminology came to deﬁne new identities and new grounds of
inclusion/exclusion among key populations in India. They make a
compelling case that monitoring forms do not simply reﬂect a pre-
existing reality, but construct realities. Biradavolu et al. (2015)
examine the unintended consequences of a community-based
monitoring system for sex worker interventions in India, ﬁnding
that despite its good intentions, the system deskilled and under-
mined sex workers, replacing their contextually-sensitive counting
systems with a less responsive universal system, thus constituting
disempowered sex workers and problematic data. This article seeks
to contribute to this research agenda, but with a different focus. It
asks: How do the on-the-ground users of M&E systems in HIV in-
terventions in India experience those systems? By asking this
question, we seek to understand the effects of M&E practices, not in
producing data, but on the everyday work and experience of
running interventions.
2. Context: monitoring HIV interventions in India
At the time of the ﬁeldwork for this study (2011e2012), the
governance of the HIV response in India was undergoing a transi-
tion. Since 2003, it had been led by two agencies, working in par-
allel: the Indian government's National AIDS Control Organisation
(NACO) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation's Avahan pro-
gramme. These agencies divided their responsibilities geographi-
cally, with the Avahan programme operating in certain districts in
the six highest-prevalence states, while NACO was responsible for
the rest. In line with international principles of ‘aid effectiveness’,
‘harmonisation’ and ‘coordination’, the government and
philanthropy-funded programmes were closely coordinated, hav-
ing similar structures in place at each administrative and
geographical level (Hill et al., 2012). Both programmes employed a
common operational structure of distributing funds to organisa-
tions operating at the state level, i.e. State AIDS Control Societies
and international NGOs respectively. In both cases, these state level
agencies managed the funding, commissioning, and evaluation of
Targeted Interventions, which were sub-contracted to and imple-
mented by local NGOs and CBOs at ﬁeld level. During the ﬁeldwork,
the Avahan programme was in a transition phase, with its funding
and HIV intervention programme management being handed over
to the Indian Government (Rao, 2010; Sgaier et al., 2013).
The government and Avahan programmes took a common
approach to intervention, with three main components. First, pre-
vention activities took place through peer-based outreach, inwhich
members of key populations, working as peer educators, commu-
nicated behaviour change messages and distributed condoms.
Second, a medical component was provided through project-run
clinics for HIV/STI testing and treatment. Finally, a ‘social compo-
nent’ aimed at advocacy and empowerment to foster community
participation and ‘ownership’, by promoting local leadership.
Across each of these components, M&E activities were conducted,
to record and evaluate each NGO's achievements in each inter-
vention strand against targets set centrally by the funding bodies.
This study was conducted in the context of Targeted Interventions
for sex workers, in a ‘high prevalence state’ in western India.
M&E was embedded in the job descriptions and management of
Targeted Interventions at all levels of programmes. We investigate
“M&E” as our participants deﬁned and experienced it. “M&E”
ostensibly refers to two separate processes: monitoring (i.e.
recording data about activities and outcomes), and evaluation (i.e.
assessing the success of a programme in relation to its objectives by
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M&E systems do not distinguish these two processes but use the
term “M&E” as a catch-all for thework of recording data and its use.
With the rise of ‘results-basedmanagement’, M&E is understood by
participants to be closely associated with the setting of targets and
monitoring progress towards those targets, and thus with perfor-
mance management. In what follows, we describe how the Avahan
interventions were monitored, to give a concrete example.
Government-funded interventions used slightly different in-
dicators, but with a very similar overall approach. In Avahan in-
terventions, starting from the base, peer educators (i.e. sex workers
trained and employed by the Targeted Intervention) completed a
daily diary which included indicators such as: number of one-to-
one and one-to-group sessions held; new contacts made; preven-
tion materials distributed and condoms distributed. They also
completed a weekly ‘micro-plan’ intended to help them keep track
of individual sex workers in their outreach area.
Outreach workers (who were professionally trained social
workers or experienced peer educators, supervising 10e20 peer
educators each) maintained a daily diary recording their personal
outreach indicators, such as: number of joint ﬁeld visits with peer
educators; meetings conducted with sex workers; condoms
distributed; new sex workers registered as well as recording the
minutes of all meetings. Outreach workers had the primary re-
sponsibility for data collection from the social component of the
interventions, including indicators such as: numbers of sex workers
receiving a ration card or voter card; self-help groups formed; core
committee meetings; advocacy and sensitisation workshops con-
ducted; local committees formed and networks and linkages
developed. As supervisors of the peer educators, outreach workers
collated peer educators' data from daily diaries into a ‘weekly sheet’
and a monthly ‘summary sheet’, and compiled their microplans
into a ‘monthly tracking sheet’.
Clinic staff (doctors, counsellors, and paramedics) collected data
on clinic performance, STI case management, and clinic operations.
Indicators included numbers of: sex workers attending clinic for
regular health check-up; follow-up cases; sex workers visiting the
project clinic at least once; sex workers attending the clinic for
presumptive treatment for STIs, and referrals made.
All of the above data, plus operational data (e.g. records of
visits to programme-owned STI clinics, records of registers and
minutes of meetings held by community groups and committees
at the drop-in centres) were aggregated at the implementing NGO
level on a monthly basis. NGOs also maintained detailed daily
ﬁnancial records and were responsible for sending three-monthly
reports to the state-level partner. In addition a monthly technical
report contained details of reported indicators on infrastructure
(such as number of drop in centres functional) and on ‘coverage’
(such as number of new sex workers contacted). Separately, the
monthly ﬁnancial report contained details of project expenses
under various budget headings, and the monthly narrative report
contained details of advocacy issues and success stories from the
ﬁeld.
At the state-level funding partner organisation, a project ofﬁcer
would cross-verify the data (using registers and physical forms)
during monthly supervisory visits to the NGO. The state level ofﬁce
would then compile the data from all sub-contracted NGOs,
reporting it at the central level.
This large body of data was then analysed at the central (i.e.
national) level, producing ‘league tables’ of the state-level partners.
These league tables were displayed at quarterly and annual review
meetings of the state-level partners, where achievements were
made public and praise or admonishment administered. Individual
NGOs felt the pressure to perform, as these data could be used to
justify closing an intervention.3. Method
The qualitative study draws on interviews and focus groups
with participants sampled from a wide range of agencies working
on Targeted Interventions for female, male and trans sex workers,
in a high prevalence state in western India. The identity of research
site remains undisclosed for ethical reasons. The paper investigates
users' experiences of M&E systems. The users, in this context,
include both NGO staff and donor staff. Data collection took place
between August 2011 and January 2012. Ethical approval was
granted by the Glasgow Caledonian University School of Health
Ethics Committee, and participants took part under conditions of
voluntary, informed consent. Interviews and group discussions
were conducted in the participants’ preferred language by the ﬁrst
author, audio-recorded, and later translated and transcribed
verbatim in English. The ﬁrst author had formerly been employed
as a project ofﬁcer on an Avahan-funded HIV intervention
(2005e2007), followed by research work in the same ﬁeld. This
experience resulted in networks which were used for recruitment
for this study, during which new networks were also generated.
This research was conducted as an independent PhD project, with
university funding.
3.1. NGO participants
We used focus groups to study the experiences of NGO workers,
aiming to generate rich, conversational data, reﬂecting users’ con-
cerns. Each focus group was composed of participants from within
the same NGO, so that participants were all talking about the same
M&E system, and could build on their common experience.
Purposive sampling of NGOs aimed for diversity along two di-
mensions seeking to reﬂect the diversity of provision in the sector.
The dimensions were: (i) funding source (Avahan/government); (ii)
mission (service delivery/empowerment). Our sample of six NGOs
included representatives from three funded by Avahan and three
funded by government; and three of the six had a service-delivery
ethos and three had an explicit agenda of empowerment or
participation.
In total, 51 NGO participants took part, across the six focus
groups. Each focus group contained a diversity of participants, and
included both professional NGO staff and representatives of sex
workers. Professional staff were typically young, middle class,
educated to degree level, and held job titles including counsellors,
ﬁeld ofﬁcers, M&E ofﬁcers, accountants, project managers or doc-
tors. Sex worker participants usually had very low incomes and
little formal education. They were peer educators, community
paramedics, and board members of committees.
Focus groups were structured by a topic guide addressing three
main issues: (i) workers' understanding of their organisation's
purposes; (ii) experiences of day-to-day implementation of M&E;
(iii) prospects for alternative M&E systems. Focus groups lasted an
average of 2 hours.
3.2. Donor participants
We used individual in-depth interviews with donor employees,
rather than focus groups, because they were geographically
dispersed, and to allow them ﬂexibility, privacy and openness to
talk about sensitive issues.
The primary inclusion criterion for donor employees was that
they had experience within the last ﬁve years of working on
funding-management of HIV-related Targeted Interventions in
western India. Current and former donor employees (both
governmental and Avahan) were included. Purposive sampling
aimed for diversity in terms of (i) employer; (ii) level of seniority. A
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contacts and those of colleagues. Ten interviews were conducted
with donor representatives. Five were employees of government
organisations, and ﬁve were employed by large onward-granting
NGOs. The sample included representatives of central, regional
and local donor organisation structures: ranging from the Project
Ofﬁcer of a government-funded Technical Support Unit, to senior
positions in State-Level (Avahan-funded) and Central-government-
level organisations.
Interviews were guided by the same topics as the focus group
topic guide, with the addition of a section focusing on the re-
lationships between the different actors involved in M&E. They
lasted for an average of 1.5 hours.
3.3. Analysis
Focus groups and interviews were audio-recorded and tran-
scribed for analysis. Thematic analysis was used to code for par-
ticipants' experiences of M&E. Each dataset was analysed
separately, to preserve the distinctiveness of the NGO and donor
employee voices. Following Attride-Stirling's step-wise approach to
thematic analysis, for each dataset, analysis began by generating
descriptive codes, which were progressively grouped into basic
themes, further grouped into ‘organising themes’, and ultimately a
‘global theme’ for each dataset (Attride-Stirling, 2001). Organising
themes had clear value judgements attached. Some identiﬁed is-
sues that were clearly positive for participants, others were seen as
negative, and we separate out the positive and negative themes
when we present them below. Coding was validated by a team of
researchers familiar with the project, who reviewed the coding
framework, its application to interview and group discussion
transcripts, and contributed to interpretation of the data into the
organising and global themes.
4. Results
This section presents the ﬁndings for each group separately, ﬁrst
the NGO participants, then the donor participants. For each group,
we ﬁrst illustrate the ‘global theme’, that is, the concept that syn-
thesises their experience as a whole. This sets the context for dis-
cussion of the individual organising themes, which convey the
positive and negative impacts of M&E in turn.
4.1. NGO workers: targets vs.“real work”
Overall, NGO participants reported overwhelmingly negative
perceptions of M&E, repeatedly contrasting what they saw as
‘inappropriate’ targets with what they considered their ‘real work’.
The focus groups began with a discussion of each NGO's purpose,
principles and history. Participants spoke enthusiastically about
their commitment to improving the lives of marginalised people:
R5: We are living for others; we are trying to bring about change in
other people's lives. That is one thing I really feel proud of. [Group
discussion-4].
When they spoke of what they were proud of, they identiﬁed
achievements that were often not recorded in M&E systems, and
which oftenwent ‘beyond the call of duty’. They described working
longer than their scheduled hours, beyond their job description
(e.g. raising funds for a needy sex worker) or working without pay
when funds were delayed, emphasising their commitment to a
cause that went beyond how they were monitored and managed.
The empowerment of sex workers and development of trusting
relationships featured repeatedly as descriptions of their ‘realwork’. In terms of empowerment, achievements identiﬁed included
supporting sex workers to: negotiate with police ofﬁcers; resist
local thugs; negotiatewith clients; work in an NGO ofﬁce; attend an
international conference; or serve as a representative of sex
workers at a local or regional level. The goals of behaviour-change-
communication with sex workers or distributing condoms (seen as
key indicators) were rarelymentioned. In general, they doubted the
ability of M&E to capture what was most important:
AS: Can you think of ways in which these things, important from
your point of view could be incorporated in the M & E? Whether
there are any different methods? Do you have any suggestions?
R5: Trust.
R1: These things we are proud of and are related to our feelings,
they cannot be bound anywhere. It cannot be tied down, that is
what I think. Like to write it down as data, or put it as data, that
cannot be done.
R1: If it is a tick mark then it becomes a form, and how can you put
feelings in a form? [Group discussion-1].
According to programme documents, monitoring of the social
component of interventions should include measures or narratives
reﬂecting such social achievements as empowerment or advocacy
(Bill&Melinda Gates Foundation, 2013). Yet participants expressed
a view that clinical and behavioural indicators were prioritised over
social indicators, and that the depth of their achievements and
extent of their efforts were not recognised in line with ﬁndings of
George et al. (2015).
Their views were not all negative, however. The following three
themes convey the advantages of M&E as reported by participants.
While the ﬁrst can be described as an ‘intended beneﬁt’ in that it
reﬂects one of the establishing goals in M&E in enabling better
programme management and improving accountability, the other
two are seen as ‘unintended consequences’, reﬂecting a more
instrumental, indeed cynical use of M&E, uses which do not
contradict participants' claims that existing M&E processes are not
reﬂective of their ‘real work’.4.1.1. Intended beneﬁts: programme planning and ﬁnancial
accountability
Reﬂecting the formal goals of M&E, NGO participants identiﬁed
practical beneﬁts of M&E in terms of aiding effective programme
planning and ﬁnancial accountability. They described how
compiling routine data on outreach activities enabled them to have
a better understanding of the needs of the communities they
worked with, to better target their activities, e.g. choosing the best
location for their mobile medical van according to numbers of
beneﬁciaries in a particular location.When asked about the value of
the daily diaries, the following participants elaborated:
R1: [We learn] what sort of services they [sex workers] have
received [and] what services they need. Are they indulging in high
risk behaviour? How many clients does she serve? Has the number
of clients reduced over time? So we have all that information with
us […].
R3: We understand her condom needs.
R1: If she has forgotten her dates to visit the clinic, we get hold of
her and remind her. We understand all this about them. With this
data we know about the girls and it is useful for them as well.
[Group discussion-5].
The participants felt that one of the plausible purposes of M&E
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deemed important in a context in which corruption is acknowl-
edged to be rife, withmany stories in circulation of NGODirectors or
founders purchasing large properties or multiple vehicles through
rents, bribes, or siphoning off funds. A counsellor commented:
R2: When a person gives funds then he would deﬁnitely keep a
check, if I am giving funding then [I want to know] whether it is
reaching the beneﬁciaries […] If the funds do not reach the bene-
ﬁciaries then what is the use of giving money? [Group discussion-
4].
In addition, participants also mentioned expenditure informa-
tion as serving an important role in accountability in terms of
tracking whether activities were being undertaken as expected. For
instance, an under-spend on ‘medical services’ might reveal that
greater effort needed to be made in that area.
4.1.2. Unintended beneﬁt: CV building
Developing skills in M&E was itself seen as a valuable and
marketable advantage for individual NGO participants. Skills in
programme management, training, data collection, reporting and
documentation, presentation and networking were identiﬁed as
improving the participants’ value in the labour market.
R1: I have learnt a lot from this funding agency, my documentation
skill has improved, my presentation skill improved, I met several
new people, I will never say that I did not get a chance to learn from
it. I learnt a lot. [Group discussion 2].
The skills and experience gained from undertaking M&E, using
the computerised system, and the networks developed through a
large scale business model programme were all considered useful
advantages of working for targeted interventions.
4.1.3. Instrumental beneﬁt: demonstrating success and credibility
NGOworkers appreciated the role of M&E in serving as evidence
of their own individual work, and the work of their organisation.
They valued the data generated as evidence of their high-level of
performance and sincerity, and expected it to be useful evidence in
the quest for future funding:
R9: Yes, there is [value], we can present it to visitors, particularly
those who come from outside: this [is the] sort of work we do. Or
when applying for a new project we can show the work we have
done so far. Because it is in a written format, so we can show it. It is
good in that way.[Group discussion-5].
This instrumentalism carries forward into the negative percep-
tions of M&E processes, which follow below. Two kinds of com-
plaints were identiﬁed: complaints about undesirable or unethical
means used to boost performance on themonitored indicators; and
complaints about the choice of indicators themselves.
4.1.4. Over-reliance on incentives
For our participants, the meaning of M&E was closely bound up
with the use of monitoring data to assess NGOs’ performance
against targets, often conceived as a competition between NGOs.
Participants expressed concern that an obsession with meeting
targets for sex workers' participation was leading to the use of
expensive incentives, to achieve short-term results at the expense
of sustainability. Participants described an abundance of gifts (such
as umbrellas, t-shirts, saris and bags) available to incentivise sex
workers' attendance at project events, and generous funds availableto make Targeted Interventions’ premises and activities more
attractive. This issue was particularly salient for those NGOs un-
dergoing transition from Avahan to government funding, which
entailed a controversial drop in funding levels.
R1: When we asked [donors from private philanthropy] for some-
thing that would help to increase the number of patients, then they
used to immediately sanction it. ‘You take anything’. We used to get
tents, games [Group discussion-6].
However:
R3:. […] When we received funding from the corporate [donor, i.e.
private philanthropy] … there were plenty of resources, now after
government [has taken over], resources have reduced.[Group dis-
cussion -6].
Participants explained their grievance as relating to the impact
of incentives on sex workers' commitment to HIV-protective
behaviour and to the use of sexual health services. They
described their ‘real work’ as mobilising sex workers to protect
their health, to demand access to health services, and to take
ownership of community interventions, and saw these goals as
directly undermined by a model of offering material rewards in
return for accessing project services. One participant indicated the
likely response by sex workers:
R7: [We provided] all that you can give when there is funding, and
when that is not there then, ‘why should we come to you? What
would we get in return?’ This is a big hazard. [Group discussion-2].4.1.5. Use of coercion
Beyond using incentives, some participants spoke of the use of
coercion to boost performance in measured indicators. They
described colleagues threatening sex workers that they would
involve the police if sufﬁcient numbers of them were not being
tested. They explicitly described this problem as deriving from the
pressure to performwell on the set indicators e again, irrespective
of the means used to meet the targets.
R2: I felt that these women [NGO staff] have invested so much of
their energy to change the mindset of these women [sex workers],
but today by simply using the word ‘police’ their ‘no's’ were
transformed into 'yes'. And sex workers immediately agreed to
what NGOs were asking them to do. So ultimately what has one
achieved by all this? So should we really say that this is voluntary
testing? It's the process by which the statistics are increased. […]
But other [NGOs] used all these means to achieve their target. And
they will meet targets, if they threaten people like this. [Group
discussion-2].
Participants felt that the logic of incentives and coercion was
difﬁcult to resist: if other NGOs were seen to play by those rules,
thereby achieving high results, in a competitive NGO environment,
not using incentives and coercion risked the organisation's results
and thus their continued sustainability.4.1.6. Misleading indicators: inﬂexible and inappropriate
The majority of participants criticised the choice of indicators
used by donors. They felt that indicators were chosen on the basis
of being easy to measure whilst neglecting longer-term and hard-
to-measure outcomes such as empowerment or ‘level of aware-
ness’ of HIV status. As a result, they suggested that the donors'
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different outcomes.
R3: The indicators should be [measured] through a qualitative
process […] .for example number of ‘self-reported’ women
[reporting to an STI clinic voluntarily]. [Under the current
funding structure] All of them are escorted: peers accompany
them to the clinic. But how many women go by themselves? This
could be a qualitative indicator. Deﬁnitely! But this is not noticed.
[Only] the total number is checked. [Group discussion-2].
R3 here suggests that a sex worker independently attending a
clinic is a much more signiﬁcant achievement, indicating a change
in a woman's own health-seeking behaviour, compared to the sex
worker being brought in by a peer educator. This is another
example of R3 conveying that high quality, ‘real work’ was not
being measured. Arguably, such insights from users could be taken
into account in improving the M&E system, to make such distinc-
tions where they are important.
Some NGO staff expressed frustration that a narrow focus on
performance according to de-contextualised indicators might
achieve ostensibly large numbers, but at the expense of the validity
of those numbers. For example:
R12: Does a seventy-year-old woman need to undergo HIV testing
or does she require food to eat? She was FSW [female sex worker],
now she is seventy years old, would you tell her that: ‘you are in
this trade, it does not matter how you do it, but you get tested for
HIV’. She would say: ‘I work on a tea stall, why do you want to do
HIV testing?’. They [donors] should implement actual need-based
programmes. [Group discussion-4].
Others complained about the narrowness of indicators used,
arguing that M&E systems focused on medical aspects of HIV to the
neglect of social aspects.
R1: About Mental Health, the funding agency does not feel it's
important […], there is no knowledge of sexuality. […] [Named
NGO] believes that there is a real need for sensitization related to
sexual identity and sexuality, […] but the funds that we are
demanding for that [work] are not approved by funding agencies.
They think that we are talking nonsense, and there is no need for
such things currently. The needs of MSM and the gay community
are only HIV and STI according to funders. [Group discussion-1].
Returning to the theory that monitoring systems constitute
rather than mirror reality, participants considered that indicators,
by virtue of their use to compare NGOs' performance, were
constituting a competitive environment, in which Targeted In-
terventions were becoming constituted as ruthless means of
reaching targets, to the neglect of data quality, validity of indicators,
or sex workers’ rights not to attend clinics or be tested. Moreover,
by prioritising clinical indicators over social indicators, the M&E
system constitutes peer educators as supports for clinical work
rather than as empowering change agents. In the process, it could
be argued that M&E is being constituted as an instrument of
discipline rather than an instrument of improvement.4.2. Donor employees: “monitoring is our duty”
Donor staff were often very critical of their M&E system, voicing
similar challenges to those raised by the NGO participants cited
above. Nonetheless, they spoke of M&E as an important part of
their professionalism, describing it as their ‘duty’.4.2.1. Programme improvement through professionalisation,
transparency and accountability
The majority of donor staff described the core purpose of M&E
as feeding back important information from the ﬁeld in order to
improve programmes. They described the whole process as more
ﬂexible than did the NGO participants, suggesting that pro-
grammes, and even indicators, could be altered if needed. One
donor employee described reﬁning the indicators used, upon
observing an anomaly:
R: The peer educator was supposed to be a role model but was not
acting as a role model. They were encouraging the community to go
for an internal check-up, a monthly check up, but when we asked
them whether they themselves conducted the monthly checkups
and an internal check-up we realized that they themselves were
not following the guidelines. They were preaching but not prac-
tising. This immediately got the attention of the donors. Then, I
remember, in the next phase of MIS [monitoring and information
systems review and revision] we tried to track peer educators so
that they have to do their monthly check up. So these changes that
we see are some concrete examples that the programmes have
changed in line with the learning from the ﬁeld. [DI-10].
Donor employees also described ensuring ﬁnancial account-
ability as another key purpose of M&E; helping to keep a check on
potential corruption and malpractice and to respond accordingly:
R: For example, they [NGO] have withdrawn a huge amount of cash
when the programme did not need it. Or they have acquired assets
without getting quotations [for their purchase]. There are certain
indicators which are very sensible; [indicative of whether] they are
siphoning off money and not paying the staff. Or they [for example
NGO director] have relatives as the staff, or they have rented their
own residence to the project. So as far as ﬁnances go, they look at
these indicators […]. If there is any stark development, then the
team [donors] from the State goes and visits them, and if they are
ﬁne, they are given threemonths [to justify the expenses], and if they
are not able to recover then they are terminated midway.[DI-5].
The transparency of the M&E process was described as an
advantage. Donor employees valued M&E as a way of pro-
fessionalising their relationship with NGOs. For example, the NGOs
were said to try to use their informal connections at the central
level, bypassing their appropriate point of contact at the state level,
to try to achieve beneﬁts or to compensate for weak performance.
Insisting on the primacy of M&E data was a way of avoiding such
interpersonal pressures on donor employees, and the risks that
donor representatives might seek to favour particular NGOs. This
served two purposes: decentralising the management of pro-
gramme activities and establishing that powerful connections
could not be used by NGOs to gain unfair advantages.
R:We do not want to talk to the facility [NGO] directly because then
the facilities think that they have a direct connection to the centre
and therefore they do not respect the district and the state levels
anymore and they say that ‘we are in direct touch with the centre’.
That is the situation that we avoid, but we are connected with their
performance in a way so we monitor their data.[DI-5].
4.2.2. Donor perceived failings: data problems and local
insensitivities
Donor staff expressed even deeper cynicism than NGO workers
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ded to blame the donors (for choosing the wrong targets, or
encouraging the use of incentives), donor staff tended to blame the
NGOs.
A majority of informants reported that the current M&E system
generated a huge amount of data, but that this data was not ana-
lysed fully, undermining its contributed to the intended purpose of
programme improvement and learning.
R: We enter lot of data but we do not analyze it. So [a] lot of lengthy
reports are generated, a lot of registers are maintained, but nobody
sits down and looks at how this is going to help me change and
improve my project management at monthly level. They wait for
the annual evaluation from the funder agency and then based on
that they take corrective actions, otherwise on their own they do
not reﬂect on their data, and analyze it. [DI-5].
The common reasons given for this failure were a lack of human
resources, short time frames for reporting or short project duration.
Some donor interviewees were very sceptical of the numbers
returned in M&E forms, claiming that NGOs could modify (or
falsify) reports to claim better results than were actually justiﬁed.
R: Let us say that if we set up a programme which says that only if
you can enrol 1000 female sex workers, will you get a project. If
that is your criteria set for getting the project and if I am an NGO in
the ﬁeld and I know there are 200 sex workers in the area, [then] I
am somehow going to ﬁnd 1000 sex workers, because I want to get
the project [funding]. But to get the project itself, I might have to
either openly falsify ﬁgures, or I may look at many people who may
not be sex workers, to be seen as sex workers . [DI-7].
The same interviewee explained his reasoning, believing that
the pressures on NGO staff to demonstrate results were more
powerful than the incentive to represent reality truthfully.
R: If I am a worker with an NGO, and I know my boss wants to hear
that the moon is black then I say that the moon is black.[DI-7].
Mirroring NGO workers' complaint that indicators were often
insensitive to local contexts, donor employees also expressed doubt
over the appropriateness of some of the chosen indicators. For
example, the following donor employee argued that an unintended
consequence of disaggregating the population into different ‘risk
groups’ (e.g. positive people, sex workers) was identiﬁcation and
stigmatisation of individuals attending speciﬁc events, in line with
Lorway and Khan's (2014) argument that categories used to
monitor constitute identities.
R: It should not be that today is Tuesday; it is positive people's day.
That is, without saying, you have said it [revealed the HIV status of
those who attend]. This should not happen, it is a common pro-
gramme of ICTC [integrated counselling and testing centre], and in
that you invite everybody. [DI-2].
Interviewees conveyed an understanding of the complex re-
alities of practical local contexts, and their dissatisfaction that in-
dicators developed at a central level, designed to provide
epidemiologically relevant information, did not take into account
the indicators’ effects or interpretation at a grassroots level.5. Discussion
This paper reveals a remarkable congruence between the viewsof NGO and donor users of M&E systems in the HIV/AIDS sector in
India. Both groups articulated the ostensible purposes of M&E, and
identiﬁed beneﬁts in terms of ﬁnancial accountability and accurate
record-keeping. However, they also reported failures to measure
important social outcomes, failures to distinguish between super-
ﬁcial and more sustainable ways of meeting targets, falsiﬁcation of
data, unintended consequences and under-use of data. The signif-
icance of monitoring was bound up with target-setting, pressure to
meet or exceed targets, and competition between NGOs to
demonstrate results. In terms of the purported aims of M&E, this
study suggests that monitoring may be playing a positive role in
developing ﬁnancial accountability; that monitoring is being used
to assess programme effectiveness, though participants question
the validity of the effectiveness data; and that monitoring is not
being used as a means of feedback and programme improvement.
We argue that overall, for our participants, the activity of moni-
toring is being constituted as an instrument of performance man-
agement and disciplining of NGOs, and not as an instrument of
rational programme improvement. We conclude by discussing
methodological, practical and conceptual implications of our
ﬁndings.
At a methodological level, we hope that this study has demon-
strated the value of investigating users' experiences of imple-
menting M&E systems. It is a commonplace in health policy
research that policies made in globally central ofﬁces are not
seamlessly put into practice in local settings, but that they undergo
transformations in order to work locally, and that they may have
unexpected and adverse effects (Campbell et al., 2012; Cornish
et al., 2012; Lorway and Khan, 2014; Mosse, 2005). Users have
important information on the actual processes of implementation,
including the relative priority given to different aspects of a pro-
gramme, the unintended consequences of monitoring efforts, and
the activities that are not captured or valued by the monitoring
system. Speaking to the users of M&E systems sheds light on the
ways that monitoring is put into practice and valued in practice.
Written policies and M&E frameworks may mention social out-
comes and endorse ﬂexibility, but those principles may not make it
through to implementation. If the donor's performance manage-
ment prioritises clinical indicators over social ones (or is believed to
do so), appears unable to take account of local nuance and context,
or seems naïve to gaming or coercion, those implementing the
M&E system are likely to respond accordingly, and prioritise and
present the kinds of data believed to bemost important. In sum, the
implementation of M&E systems itself requires monitoring.
Practically, could M&E be done better, so that the problems
identiﬁed by our participants could be resolved? Our participants
were asked this question, and had some suggestions. At the
simplest level, better indicators could be chosen. For instance, as
suggested, indicators could assess whether a sex worker was self-
referred or accompanied to a clinic. Indicators for social outcomes
such as stigma reduction, advocacy to police, reduction in violence,
empowerment or solidarity exist in the research literature and
could in principle be developed andmodiﬁed for local contexts. But
social outcomes of HIV/AIDS interventions are often poorly moni-
tored because they have been difﬁcult to deﬁne and operationalise,
and because they are context-dependent and not as easily trans-
ferred and compared across settings as are clinical or behavioural
indicators (Mannell et al., 2014). This problem of context-
dependence suggests that simply writing better indicators is not
a full solution. If what should be measured is dependent upon
context, then the process of designing M&E systems needs to allow
for greater grassroots participation in the deﬁnition of objectives
and monitoring practices, and ﬂexibility in the choice of indicators.
Instituting such a ﬂexible process is more challenging than simply
writing new indicators because it challenges the objective of
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of comparability may be a trade-off that is worth making. But
implementing community-based monitoring systems raises a host
of further challenges and has often resulted in disappointment
(Biradavolu et al., 2015). As we suggest below, M&E faces structural
problems that go deeper than the selection of indicators or more
bottom-up processes.
Conceptually, we have sought to investigate how M&E systems
are constituting the practice and experience of NGO and donor
work. Monitoring can serve as a useful tool of rational programme
improvement, as long as relevant and valued indicators are used,
the data are meaningfully compiled at regular intervals, fed back to
programme managers and implementers, and acted upon. For
programme staff, evidence that monitoring data provides means of
advancing their ‘real work’ makes the process of monitoring
meaningful and valuable. In the absence of such experience,
monitoring risks becoming a meaningless and ‘empty’ ritual,
completed because it is required by donors but not because it
serves local purposes. This has implications for data quality. If, like
Mate et al. (2009) we assume that staff buy-in is important to the
quality of monitoring data, these ﬁndings are worrying. If staff do
not have conﬁdence in the M&E system they are unlikely to pri-
oritise accurate record-keeping. Moreover, if M&E does not reﬂect
the ‘real work’ but is seen as a ‘game to be played’, then staff may be
incentivised to game the system, further undermining the validity
of the data. It is possible that the processes identiﬁed here are more
widespread than this particular case, and therefore that data
collected using existing systems may be less valid and reliable than
has been assumed.
However, the enormous commitment of resources, high fre-
quency of demands for M&E reports, and major consequences of
M&E mean that, of course, the ‘ritual’ is not ‘empty’. As an alter-
native to being understood as a rational means of programme
improvement, M&E can also be understood as a means of perfor-
mance management, whose massive consequences in contexts of
insecurity (e.g., closure or expansion of a project, redundancies,
performance-related pay) have been described by Ball (2003) as the
“terrors of performativity”. The structural situation of M&E sys-
tems, as tools for determining ﬂows of resources from donors to
implementing NGOs in a situation of competition for shrinking
funds, and a hegemony of results-based management, decimates
their capacity to function as locally-intelligent means of pro-
gramme improvement. But rituals would not be maintained if they
were entirely empty. The ritual of M&E is full of meaning as a
legitimised way of managing a portfolio of projects, encouraging
competition, and justifying ‘hard decisions’. Our participants
question the quality of the data gathered through such M&E sys-
tems, and thus the legitimacy of their use for important decisions.
Indeed, if the meaning of M&E is given by the use of monitoring
data to manage performance and take consequential decisions, and
if those data are as badly ﬂawed as our participants suggest, then
the current paper is an argument to reduce the meaning and power
of current M&E systems, in other words, to further empty the ritual
of M&E.
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